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This article examines the role played by civil society in the governance of the social sector. In particular 
it addresses the question of how the emergence of the ‘social market model’ affects the role that civil 
society organisations play in the governance of social services. The challenge of social markets is to 
introduce free choice and competition, without endangering the social values and objectives of the 
organisations involved. A strong involvement of civil society in the organisations is helpful for this 
purpose. However, as will be demonstrated by the case studies underlying this article, the emergence of 
social markets implies a change in civil society involvement: from direct involvement in the provision 
of social services, to indirect watchdog involvement. The nature of the civil society groups themselves 
has also changed. The new watchdog organisations are not vested in religion or ideology, but rather 
single-issue client organisations. In this article we argue that there is nothing wrong or contradictory 
in the government actively stimulating the involvement of such client organisations in the governance 
structure of the social sector. Therefore it should adopt new legislative standards giving client represen-
tation groups a formal status in the legal structure of ‘social enterprises’.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In most welfare states, civil society organisations have always played a major role in 
the governance of social (security) services. In fact, such organisations can be seen as 
a product of a particular mode of governance, which is distinct from both formal state 
governance and market regulation. However, nowadays many civil society organisa-
tions are in trouble. One of the reasons for this is the diminishing legitimacy of such 
organisations caused by, among other factors, secularisation, ‘depillerisation’ (political 
and denominational desegregation of society), and individualism. In our view, the 
emergence of social markets is another relevant factor. In such markets a variety of 
institutions compete with each other for certain favours which government contracts, 
certain rights or licences, fiscal privileges etc offer. These institutions are not only 
not-for-profit organisations operating in the domain of civil society, but also private 
commercial organisations. As a result of this competition, not-for-profit organisations 
are under pressure to act like commercial entrepreneurs, by introducing professional 
management techniques, enlarging their scales of operation and entering into new, 
1 Address of correspondence:Oude Kijk in ’t Jatstraat 26, 9712 EK Groningen. Phone: +31 50 363 
5765 / +31 50 363 9623.
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profitable activities. In doing so they lose their original flavour and character. Interest-
ingly, the social market model is not only unfavourable for civil society. It also gives 
rise to new types of organisations acting on behalf of clients, thereby representing 
‘consumer interests’; such organisations may have a high degree of grass roots partici-
pation. The role of these new organisations and their impact upon the quality of the 
social markets is constantly evolving. 
The first aim of this paper is to discuss how the social market model threatens tradi-
tional not-for-profit organisations and simultaneously gives rise to new civil society 
initiatives. Our theories in this respect are illustrated by two case studies drawn from 
the situation in the Netherlands. We will look at the demise of two traditional organi-
sations and the emergence of two new initiatives operating in the social housing sector 
and in the home care sector. These are:  
- Rochdale, an Amsterdam housing foundation which ran into trouble after it ex-
ceeded its commercial ambitions, versus Woonbond, a new alternative interest group 
representing the interest of tenants in the rental sector; and 
- Meavita, a commercial home care group which arose out of the merger of some 
former civil society organisations and which collapsed in 2009, versus Per Saldo, a 
new initiative for the protection of the interests of clients in the home care sector.
The second aim is to look at the lessons we can learn from the case studies and to come 
up with some ideas as to how the role of civil society organisations can be protected; 
how can the legal framework play a positive role in protecting the valuable function 
of civil society organisations in the social market?
This article kicks off with a brief elaboration of the key concepts used in this article, ie 
civil society organisations and social markets (chapter II). It then moves on to describe 
the theoretical and methodological background of the case studies carried out (chapter 
III). The case studies themselves and the outcomes are presented separately in the next 
chapter (IV). The last chapter (V) discusses a number of implications for the govern-
ance of social markets, which can be drawn from our case studies.
II. CONCEPTUALISING ‘CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS’ AND ‘SOCIAL 
MARKETS’
The two main concepts which were used in the introduction, ie ‘civil society organisa-
tions’ and ‘social markets’ are both illusive and controversial. Illusive in the sense that 
they accommodate a rich variety of meanings and controversial because they are often 
hijacked for political purposes. We have come up with some admittedly broad but 
hopefully neutral definitions.
Civil society organisations
The term civil society organisation refers to any legal person (either governed by pri-
vate or by public law) outside the formal state bureaucracy who represents a collective 
(non-individual) interest and who does not aim to make financial profits.2 Within this 
definition, it is thus not important whether the organisation is based on religion or 
2 For analogous definitions of the concept of civil society see: J. Cohen & A. Arato, Civil Society and 
Political Theory (MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1992), IX; D. Rueschemeyer, M. Rueschemeyer & B. 
Wittrock, Participation and Democracy East and West: Comparisons and Interpretations (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 
1998), 18. See also: L.M. Salamon, ‘Putting the Civil Society Sector on the Economic Map of the 
World’, (2010) 81 Annuals of Public and Cooperative Economics 2, 168.  
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any ideology, or merely protecting the self-interest of a group of individuals. What is 
important is that the organisation is not organised by the state and not for profit. In 
this way, the whole array of voluntary organisations, civic initiatives, organised pres-
sure groups, charity foundations, unions and employer organisations, etc are covered.
Social markets
The term social markets is derived from the concept of quasi-markets. Quasi-markets 
in the social sector have first been described by Julien le Grand in 1991 in the wake 
of reforms that were advocated by the first Blair government in the United Kingdom.3 
These reforms were based upon the expectation that the quality, responsiveness and 
efficiency of the social sector could be improved by allowing for competition between 
the agencies and by promoting the freedom of choice for the clients. This expecta-
tion has led many governments to introduce more market-styled social sector reforms. 
In social markets various agencies, public and private, commercial and not-for-profit 
compete for subsidies, government contracts, exclusive licences, fiscal privileges, or 
cash-for-care vouchers. Profit is not necessarily the only factor which determines the 
outcome of the competition. Much depends on the success of the organisations to 
obtain government privileges. For this it is necessary that they enter into co-operative 
networks, not only with the government as chief regulator or principal, but also with 
the clients as the ‘buyers’ of the social services involved. 
In economic literature the concept of the quasi-market has also attracted criticism. No 
market is perfect and therefore the term is too indistinct. Also, it is too normative, as 
if it wants to tacitly condone the introduction of market forces in the public sector.4 
Without devaluing this criticism this article employs the term social markets to connote 
a mode of governance whereby the government organises social services through third 
parties for the purpose of introducing competition between these parties and enhanc-
ing the freedom of choice for citizens as buyers of these social services. A characteristic 
of the social market model is that the parties involved compete for certain government 
rights; be it subsidies, grants, licences, fiscal privileges, contracts, etc. This gives rise to 
a commercialisation of the activities involved. Another characteristic is – nonetheless – 
that the commercial activities of the players in the social markets are closely regulated 
and monitored by the government in order to realise policy objectives: social protec-
tion, a high level of services, cost efficiency, etc.
III. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
 
The introduction to this article might suggest there is a direct link between the demise 
of traditional civil society organisations and the emergence of social markets; in the 
good old days of the post-war welfare states such organisations were flourishing, but 
since neoliberal governments introduced market forces they are gradually disappearing. 
Of course this is a caricature of the real situation. The German sociologist Ingo Bode 
has rightly pointed out that such narrative fails to access the contradictory and com-
3 J. Le Grand, ‘Quasi-Markets and Social Policy’, (1991) 408 The Economic Journal 101, 1256-1276; 
J. Le Grand, The Other Invisible Hand: Delivering Public Services through Choice and Competition (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2007); See also: T. Brandsen, Quasi-Market Governance: an Anatomy of 
Innovation (Lemma, Utrecht, 2004); R. Flynn, & G. Williams (eds), Contracting for Health: Quasi-Markets 
and the NHS (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997). 
4 Cf R. McMaster, ‘A Veblenian-inpired critique of the “quasi-market” concept’, (2001) 28 International 
Journal of Social Economics 9, 710-724.
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plex nature of the new governance regime which – following broader evolutions in 
the political economy of the late modern societies – is emerging in Western Europe.5 
He comes to the conclusion that while in Western European countries ‘voluntary or-
ganisations’ have been important in the past, their role is now changing as a result of 
an entire shift in governance structures that has been taken place over a longer period 
of time. This shift involves the introduction of ‘new resource management’ by civil 
society organisations, ‘new patterns of communication strategies’ and a ‘process of 
disorganisation of the public/private welfare mix’. The picture that emerges is that of 
a highly complex and changeable governance structure in which civil society organisa-
tions have to find their way between pure market opportunism and the old firm alli-
ances with the public welfare state. In doing so, they invest in networking, lobbying 
for better quality, advertising to gain advantages over profit organisations working in 
the same field, and developing projects which attract stakeholders. In this process of 
changing roles some organisations do well and others perish. 
Bode’s description of the complexities pertaining to the governance structure of con-
temporary social markets coincides very much with the picture that emerged in our 
own research on the foundations of the regulatory welfare state.6 We happily take his 
analysis as a starting point and see how social markets impact upon the dynamics of 
civil society organisations. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the introduction, we are par-
ticularly interested in finding out how commercialisation affects the character of civil 
society organisations. Although it may be true that commercialisation is not the sole 
factor causing a change of roles for civil society, this does not mean that it is irrelevant. 
It merely has to be studied without turning a blind eye to other institutional changes. 
The underlying notion of the case studies is that ‘inside organisations’ that play a role 
in the governance and administration of the social sector threaten to lose their unique 
identity as civil society organisations once they mimic the character of commercial 
entrepreneurs. One of the reasons for this may be that the organisation and character 
of the activities are simply no longer in line with the interests of the citizens they are 
supposed to represent. The citizens are, consequently, inclined to organise their own 
interests in a separate way, through new ‘outside organisations’ which are not part of 
the social sector bureaucracy. Within market terms, such civic initiatives are very much 
like consumer pressure groups, but within the framework of the hybrid and heavily 
regulated social markets. They can also be looked upon as new civil society organisa-
tions, which play a crucial role in the governance of the social sector as a whole. The 
purpose of the case studies is to offer illustrations of how the commercialisation of 
activities affects the character and role of some old and new civil society organisations 
in practice and to describe the institutional changes that have taken place. 
The theoretical discourse of consumerism in social markets is usually associated with 
the idea of individual consumers driven by maximising their own preferences in the 
market place through freedom of choice.7 This consumerist conception of social ser-
vices also underlies Le Grand’s notion of quasi-markets, wherein passive recipients of 
5 I. Bode, ‘Disorganized welfare mixes: voluntary agencies and new governance regimes in Western 
Europe’, (2008) 16 Journal of European Social Policy 4, 346-359.
6 Cf G. Vonk & A.Tollenaar, Social Security as a Public Interest: a Multidisciplinary Inquiry into the Foundations of 
the Regulatory Welfare State (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2010).
7 See for instance: M. Fotaki, ‘Towards Developing New Partnerships In Public Services: Users as 
Consumers, Citizens and/or Co-Producers in Health and Social Care in England and Sweden’, 
(2010) 89 Public Administration 3, 933-955; J. Clarke, J. Newman & N. Smith, Creating Citizen-
Consumers: Changing Publics and Changing Public Services (Sage, London, 2007).
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social services are transformed into empowered consumers.8 While Le Grand’s analysis 
centres around the consumer as an individual actor, in this article we are interested 
in the collective aspects of consumerism. As we will illustrate, social markets may 
strengthen the rise of new types of collective consumer organisations that behave like 
politically engaged pressure groups and which can be seen as modern types of civil 
society organisations.9 
Our case studies concern two negative stories and two positive ones. The first relates to 
organisations that are involved in the provision of social services (in that way qualified 
as insiders) and the second to new client organisations (qualified as outsiders).
Insiders: Meavita and Rochdale
The negative stories concern Meavita and Rochdale. These organisations are character-
ised by the fact that they grew out of various mergers of pre-existing civil society 
organisations. Meavita became the largest Dutch home care company operating mainly 
in the Northern provinces, employing 20,000 members of staff. Its ambitions were 
fully commercial. However, the new health care giant was increasingly caught up in 
rumours about financial and organisational mismanagement, expensive advertising, 
conflicts and scandals. 
The story of Rochdale, a social housing cooperation operating in the city of Amsterdam, 
is to some extent comparable to that of Meavita. Rochdale also went through a process of 
mergers and changing management structures. Officially, it has a not-for-profit status, 
but increasingly entered into the commercial real estate business. The commercial 
activities started to overshadow everything else, until the whole thing burst revealing 
scandals about mismanagement, excessive pay for the managers, wrong investment in 
expenses offices and rumours about corruption. 
The case studies of these two organisations should cast light on at least three questions:
- What are the characteristics of the ‘social markets’ in which Meavita and Rochdale 
operated?
- To what extent could Meavita and Rochdale still be qualified as civil society organisa-
tions in the sense of our definition?
- Were the main reasons for the downfall of both organisations linked to the com-
mercialisation of their activities or were other factors involved as well?
 
For the purposes of the case studies the concept ‘commercialisation’ is operationalised 
with reference to three elements, ie a) profit motive b) marketing strategies and c) 
expansion and diversification.
Outsiders: Per Saldo and Woonbond
In contrast to the above-mentioned stories neither Per Saldo nor Woonband are involved 
in the organisation or provision of social services; they are set up as pressure groups 
8 J. Le Grand, Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy: of Knights and Knaves, Pawns and Queens (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2003). See also: A. Giddens, ‘Living In a Post-traditional Society’, in U. Beck, A. 
Giddens & S. Lash (eds), Reflexive Modernisation: Politics Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order 
(Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994). For a critique of the individualistic consumerist model of social 
service provision, see for instance: C. Needham, Citizen-Consumers: New Labour’s Marketplace Democracy 
(The Catalyst Forum, London, 2003).
9 I. Shaw & A. Aldridge, ‘Consumerism, Health and Social Order’, (2003), 2 Social Policy and Society 
1, 37. See also: Y. Gabriel & T. Lang, The Unmanageable Consumer: Contemporary Consumption and Its 
Fragmentation (Sage, London, 1995).
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representing the interests of clients. In the case of Per Saldo the clients are the receivers 
of personal care budgets under the Dutch Extraordinary Medical Expenses Act and the 
Social Support Act. Personal budgets were introduced in the 1990s in order to allow 
clients to buy their care services themselves instead of relying on benefits in kind of-
fered by the health and home care institutions. The budgets can be seen as typical 
social market instruments, since they allow freedom of choice for the consumers and 
competition between care providers. In the case of Woonbond the clients are tenants in 
rental accommodation. 
Per Saldo and Woonbond are successful organisations. Their long-term existence is well-
guaranteed and they are increasingly involved in the governance of the health/home 
care and social housing markets. Both organisations arose out of civic initiatives. As 
they can be seen as clients groups representing the interests of the consumer, they are 
in a sense the by-product of the same commercialisation that led to the downfall of 
Rochdale and Meavita; after all, consumer pressure is a typical feature of the market.  
The case studies of these organisations address the following four questions:
- What is the background of the organisations and to what extent do they qualify 
as civil society organisations within the meaning of our definition?
- To what extent can the organisations be qualified as consumer organisations with-
in the meaning of economic doctrine?
- To what extent are the organisations entrusted with a role in the new governance 
of the social sector, thereby possibly losing the status of pure outside organisa-
tions?
IV. THE OUTCOMES OF THE CASE STUDIES
A. General background: the housing and home care sectors as social mar-
kets
In the Dutch welfare state, the home care infrastructure is ultimately a government 
responsibility. It is considered part of the social security system. In the past, home 
care services were provided through a network of home nursing organisations which 
were often organised on a religious or ideological basis. Over time these organisations 
became increasingly subject to government control and in a sense became part of the 
semi-public administration of the sector. In the 1980s free market systems made their 
entry into home care. New care agencies, which had no roots in the old home nursing 
organisations, came into being. More recently, legislative reforms deliberately created 
a framework for competition among the various private, voluntary and public agencies 
involved in home care. The state thereby operates as a funder of welfare services who 
purchases services from a range of competing private, voluntary and public provider 
organisations. Funds are allocated through a process whereby provider organisations 
bid for state contracts. The funds for home care services are also allocated by the pa-
tients or clients themselves. They are given an earmarked budget, a voucher or a so-
called personal budget which can be used to purchase care the way they choose and from 
a provider of their choice. 
We call this type of welfare governance markets, because monopolistic state providers 
are replaced with independent provider agencies that compete with one another. They 
are social markets because they are deliberately created by state actors to fulfil social 
objectives. These markets are created under the assumption that open competition 
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between provider agencies will bring down the costs of health care services and thus 
maximise the provision of social security. 
The housing sector also bears characteristics of a social market, but for different rea-
sons. The Netherlands have a long-standing tradition of providing affordable housing 
for the poor through so-called housing associations. These organisations as well have 
a religious or ideological basis and became more and more subject to government 
control. A social housing market was created in the beginning of the 1990s, when the 
financial ties between the associations and the government were severed. Since then, 
the associations have been financially independent and have faced new factors in their 
investment decisions; they can only fund projects if they can raise enough money. 
However, the social housing market remains highly regulated, with the government 
setting quality standards and targets. As a result, the associations are dependent on mar-
ket forces to raise the revenue needed to meet the social targets set by the government. 
Although the associations are still not geared to profit-making (in fact their legal status 
as foundations does not allow this), they have to diverge activities in order to find the 
resources for less profitable social housing projects. Often, separate legal structures are 
set up to run the commercial activities, but in practice it is apparently not always easy 
to make a sharp distinction between the funds for commercial and social activities.10
What is clear for both home care and the social housing market is that the setting of-
fers a fertile breeding ground for commercial activities. This is, for example, reflected 
in the way the organisations are managed. The increased financial independence of the 
Dutch housing associations has radically changed management styles. For over half a 
decade the associations were run like bureaucracies, with standardised work methods, 
whereas they now need managers to be able to operate as businessmen, planners and 
idealists.11 This financial independence also spurred a wave of fusions between associa-
tions. Their number decreased from 1037 in 1990 to about 701 in 2000.12 Their larger 
size presumably makes it easier to procure loans and deliver economies of scale. It also 
means the organisations need a larger bureaucracy, which causes a greater distance be-
tween the managers of housing associations and the tenants. As a matter of fact, similar 
developments took place in the administration of the home care sector. However, the 
process in which the scale of the organisations have enlarged reportedly started earlier 
under the influence of the way they were managed by central government. The num-
ber of active organisations dropped from 1450 in 1970 to merely 113 in 1996.13 Yet, 
the market-oriented reforms have resulted in a further stream of mergers, with the 
organisations being forced to focus on costs and efficiency management.14
10 M. Leuvensteijn & V. Shestalova, Investeringsprikkels voor Woningbouwcorporaties (in English: Investment 
Incentives for Housing Associations) (Centraal Planbureau, The Hague, 2006).
11 Cf H. Ter Borgt, ‘Financieel boekhouden bij woningbouwcorporaties: van boekhouding naar 
beleid’ (in English: ‘Financial Bookkeeping in Housing Associations: from Bookkeeping to Policy’), 
(2005) 3 Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie 3, 60-69.
12 A. Ouwehand & G. van Dale, Dutch Housing Associations: A Model for Social Housing (DUP Satellite, Delft, 
2002).
13 Cf P. Van Lieshout, ‘Identiteit in zorg en welzijn’ (in English: ‘Identity in Health Care and 
Welfare’), in J.P. Balkenende & T.J. van der Ploeg (eds), Behoud en vernieuwing van identiteit (in English: 
Preservation and Reform of Identity) (Lemma, Utrecht, 1999), 61-72. 
14 Market-oriented reforms have, however, also created new, smaller home care organisations.
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B. The demise of inside organisations: the (hi)stories of Meavita and Rochdale
Meavita
Meavita Nederland was the result of a managerial merger of the four home care 
agencies active in different parts of the Netherlands. These organisations had 
historical ties with former home nursing organisations, but this is as much 
as could be said about the links of Meavita with civil society; the ambitions of 
the new organisation were fully commercial. As from January 2007, the four 
care organisations gathered under one board of directors. This made Meavita 
the second largest home care company in the Netherlands, working for sixty 
municipalities and one-third of all Dutch care administration offices. 
In March 2009, Meavita filed for bankruptcy, scarcely two years after its 
establishment. At that time, the organisation had more than 20,000 employees. 
It served approximately 100,000 clients and grossed an annual turnover of 
half a billion euros. The downfall of Meavita was claimed to be caused by 
mismanagement. The subsidiary organisations were adrift: there were reports 
of administrative chaos, there were long-neglected financial problems, contracts 
were entered into below cost price, and millions were squandered on hazardous 
projects. According to audits performed in 2007 the financial situation was very 
alarming. By the middle of 2008, the organisation had negative assets of 10 
million euros, compared to positive assets of 70 million euros in 2006. In 
February 2009, the liquidity of the organisation proved to be so critical that 
payments of salaries and other debts were not guaranteed.
After its moratorium, Meavita was dismantled and its subsidiary companies 
became autonomous once again. The subsidiary companies closed down 
different branches and some of them where taken over by other home care 
agencies. In March 2009, the bankruptcy of two subsidiary companies followed. 
The Dutch government was placed in a dilemma. Given the political logic of 
liberalisation and recently introduced market strategies state intervention was 
undesirable. However, municipalities wanted to know what would happen to 
all their citizens who received home care if Meavita ceased to exist. The care 
administration offices also feared that the health care funds would lose millions. 
Eventually the Dutch Patient and Consumer Federation, the NPCF, was prepared 
to set up two foundations in order to take over tasks of health care providers. 
The two foundations took over the entire staff of Meavita that was left. The 
regional health care organisations were restarted with government aid that 
amounted to 37 million euros.
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Rochdale was established back in 1903 during the wave of housing associations 
being set up in the wake of the 1901 Housing Act. In 2003, the current 
organisation was created after a major merger of Rochdale and another housing 
association, Patrimonium. Rochdale manages around 40,000 houses in Amsterdam 
and the surrounding area, making it one of the larger housing associations in 
the Netherlands, worth well over a billion euros. The merger also brought in 
a new chairman, under whose responsibility the housing association focused 
more and more on profit-making activities, officially in order to finance social 
not-profitable housing projects in practice, however, these were activities in 
their own right. In 2008, the extravagant chairman, internally referred to as 
the sun king, gained notoriety with a well-publicised case of mismanagement 
and fraud. What came to light were dodgy deals, bad supervision and self-
enrichment. Many projects were identified as suspicious, as eg properties were 
being sold only a month after their purchase for half the price to friends of the 
chairman. As a result, the chairman was fired and the entire supervisory board 
resigned. After this scandal the organisation aimed to start afresh and launched 
a thorough investigation of the internal processes and market transactions in the 
previous years, putting the results up for public scrutiny. It also vowed to steer 
the organisation back to its core activities, namely the provision, maintenance 
and construction of social housing and the development of safe, clean and 
friendly neighbourhoods. In 2008, Rochdale started distancing itself from projects 
that did not fall within the scope of this core mission.
What is interesting in these stories for us is not so much the failing of Meavita and Roch-
dale as commercial enterprises, but their demise as civil society organisations. Admit-
tedly, Meavita never had the character of a civil society organisation from the very start, 
but the fact that after its bankruptcy some of its activities were taken over again by 
some independent, not-for-profit patient organisations shows that civil society never 
lost touch with the company (or rather the interests it was supposed to serve). Meavita 
just failed to represent the ties between the civil society and the home care sector. 
The case studies reveal that in social markets, commercialisation can take over in all 
respects, to the detriment of the traditional ties with civil society and of the interests 
of the citizens that it represents.
Firstly, both organisations were heavily engaged in marketing. For example, in an at-
tempt to establish itself firmly in the world of real estate stakeholders, Rochdale treated 
the private partners very well with expensive diners and luxury trips, as is the standard 
in the housing market. This image clashed with that of an idealistic housing associa-
tion catering for the poor. The case study of Meavita reports investments in expensive 
marketing campaigns, for example the installations of TV phones in homes of 3,000 
clients without properly investigating the clients’ needs for such equipment.
Secondly, both organisations were active in the field of expansion and diversification. The 
diversification strategy was applied to such extent that the activities far outreached the 
original social objectives, as was the case for Rochdale (eg building housing for expats in 
Spain). With regard to expansion, the organisation was simply too large to manage, 
which was the case for Meavita. 
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Thirdly, both organisations were involved in profit-making. Here, the case studies report 
a problem of culture. The conflicts and tensions both organisations faced were partly 
caused by the clash between the entrepreneurial spirit of the top management and the 
original social values cherished by the rest of the organisation. What is interesting in 
the story of Rochdale is that after the top management was sent away, the latter took 
control again, as if the roots of the organisations dug so deep that they could not be 
cut by a temporary eruption of money-grabbing in the period of real estate euphoria 
preceding the last financial crisis.
It is difficult to draw general conclusions from the stories of Meavita and Rochdale, as the 
cases might be juicy and dramatic, but not necessarily very representative. Yet, from 
a qualitative point of view the stories include some lessons for the governance of so-
cial markets, namely that the introduction of such markets might induce the relevant 
players to become so much engaged in commercialisation that they lose sight of the 
interest of their clients and, with that, eventually the public interest of realising social 
objectives. In the last chapter, we will come back to this by looking at the question 
how these lessons could translate in improvements in the governance structures of 
social markets.
C.  The emergence of outside organisations: the (hi)stories of Per Saldo and 
Woonbond
Per Saldo
Per Saldo is a relatively young organisation. Its creation coincides with the intro-
duction of the voucher system in the health care sector, the so-called personal 
budgets. Judging from its background, it is somewhat strange to qualify Per Saldo 
as an outsider. The organisation was actually set up by the government. The 
competent Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports was of the opinion that peo-
ple in need of health care should not be discouraged from acquiring a personal 
budget because managing such a budget was too complicated and involved 
a heavy administrative burden. To guarantee the accessibility of the personal 
budget scheme the Ministry decided to erect two associations, Per Saldo and Naar 
Keuze, to relieve budget holders of the necessary paperwork. These organisations 
were made responsible for making payments to health care providers and insti-
tutions, withholding income taxes and social security contributions and inform-
ing patients about the possibilities that personal budgets offer. Membership of 
one of these associations was mandatory for budget holders. 
As from 1998, the administrative tasks which Per Saldo performed on behalf of 
budget holders were transferred to the Social Insurance Bank, one of the main 
Dutch social security institutions. After this transfer, the government nonethe-
less decided to safeguard Per Saldo’s survival by supplying the association with 
the necessary funds to allow the organisation to continue performing its re-
maining tasks. These primarily concern the information and consultation of 
budget holders, but also the empowerment of budget holders. By raising issues 
and advocating a more demand-driven and self-directed mode of care, the or-
ganisation furthermore acts as a voice for budget holders in general. 
Although membership was not mandatory, the number of members kept grow-
ing, probably due to the explosive growth in the number of entitlements to a 
personal budget. Interestingly, Per Saldo also has the support of volunteers who 
fulfil various roles within the organisation.
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Per Saldo’s main source of income are state subsidies, which amount to approxi-
mately 40% of the organisation’s revenues. The other sources of income are 
proceeds out of subscriptions, membership fees, revenues from products and 
projects granted by the state. 
Woonbond
De Nederlandse Woonbond is a pressure group that represents tenants in the social 
housing sector. The organisation aims to influence legislation to secure af-
fordable, good quality housing in a safe and clean environment. It strives for 
strong tenant organisation in order to give tenants more power to exert influ-
ence. Woonbond lobbies housing associations with regard to, for example, rent 
increases, and the government for more legal rights for tenants. It also supports 
individual tenants and organises education centres. The members of Woonbond 
consist mostly of local tenant organisations; these vary from large organisations 
representing thousands of tenants to local organisations representing one street 
or block of flats. The remainder of the members are individuals. Woonbond offers 
these individual members additional services, such as legal advice and support 
when they have a conflict with their landlord.
Woonbond started in 1990 as a fusion of three existing organisations representing 
tenants. The first half of the 1990s were difficult years for Woonbond, marred 
with financial problems and an outflow of employees. In time it managed to 
overcome its troubles and by the year 2000 the organisation was well-known 
in the housing world. Since its establishment in 1990, the organisation saw its 
membership grow from 100,000 to 1.4 million in 2010. It currently employs 
48 members of staff. The financial resources of Woonbond consist primarily 
of membership contributions, some government subsidies and revenues from 
projects. 
One of Woonbond’s great successes is the introduction of the so-called Consulta-
tion Act (Overlegwet) in 1998. This act gave tenant organisations the legal right 
to consult with housing associations and it forced them to share detailed infor-
mation with tenants about topics such as renovations, demolitions and mainte-
nance. The act meant that the tenant organisations had been legally recognised 
as partners to be consulted in the management of social housing programmes. 
Woonbond also gained much publicity by awarding prizes for the best and the 
worst housing association. 
The above stories show that the qualification of the two organisations as outsiders is a 
relative one, as both organisations are partly funded and as Per Saldo was originally even 
created by the government. Nonetheless, they are outsiders in the sense that they are 
not directly involved in the delivery of social services, but rather in critically monitor-
ing social service bureaucracies on behalf of the clients. After all, their function is not 
only to provide services to their members, but also to monitor the behaviour of home 
care agencies and housing associations through public representation. In this sense 
they mimic the behaviour of consumer watchdogs that seek to protect people from 
corporate abuse. 
Apparently, in the newly emerging social markets there is a need for such consumer-
type watchdog organisations. Indeed, in our eyes the success of Per Saldo and Woonbond 
is closely connected to the emergence of social markets. As was explained earlier, due 
to structural changes and increased competition in the home care and the housing sec-
EJSL
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tor, organisations are forced to increase their size and their bureaucracy. A drawback 
of a larger bureaucracy is that the distance between the organisations and the citizens 
increases, or as it was put in our underlying case study report: ‘Gone are the days 
when tenants actually knew the people running the associations, now all the contact 
they have is a letter at the end of the year telling them by how much the rent has gone 
up.’ As a result of this impersonal relationship, citizens no longer feel represented by 
associations and are more willing to organise themselves as outsiders.  
Interestingly, the changed relationship with the citizen also manifests itself in the 
governance structure of the organisations involved. In the past, housing associations 
and home care agencies were managed by a board of governors, which were mostly 
manned by ‘responsible citizens with a track record in civic initiative’. These boards 
appointed the director, who was given the powers to conduct the daily management, 
but who remained firmly subordinate to the board. In the early nineties this model was 
changed. The new governance structure was to reflect the state of the art of corporate 
governance: the board of governors was renamed a supervisory council and the pro-
fessional board of directors was given full power to engage in entrepreneurship. The 
competences and role of these councils of supervision is still subject to discussion.15 
Also in the past many housing associations and home care agencies were real associa-
tions in the legal sense of the word. This implied that they had members, which meant 
that projects needed their backing to be accepted. This form of management became 
unpractical, if not impossible, when the associations became financially self-sufficient 
and needed a more professional, complex financial plan to ensure long-term stability. 
Nowadays, most housing associations and home care agencies have changed from be-
ing associations to being foundations, which have no members. In the social housing 
sector this again makes tenants feel less represented, which is another good reason for 
local tenant committees to join Woonbond.
With the emergence of new organisations such as Per Saldo and Woonbond, the involve-
ment of civil society has shifted from provider institutions to these types of client 
organisations. Their status as civil society organisations is beyond dispute. They are not 
part of the formal government administration and not for profit, but also (and more 
importantly from a de facto point of view): they are characterised by a high degree 
of citizen involvement. What is different is that the new organisations do not have a 
specific religious or ideological background, but this does not make them less part of 
civil society.
One could furthermore say that the emergence of social markets has not (necessarily) 
resulted in less involvement of civil society, but rather in a different type of involve-
ment. It may be so that organisations such as Per Saldo and Woonbond are ‘single-issue’ 
institutions, only representing the narrow interests of their members in a particular 
capacity (patients, tenants). But in doing so, they play an important role in controlling 
the behaviour of social service providers, thereby making sure that the commercial 
ambitions do not overshadow the interests of the stakeholders. Also, they sometimes 
take centre stage in the political debate concerning the architecture of the relevant sec-
tors. In that sense, organisations like Per Saldo and Woonbond help giving legitimacy to 
new social markets. 
15 Cf J. de Ridder, Een goede raad voor toezicht (in English: Some Good Advice for Supervisory Boards) (Boom 
Juridische uitgevers, The Hague, 2004). 
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V. LESSONS TO BE LEARNT: THE GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL MARKETS
The challenge of social markets is to introduce free choice and competition without 
endangering the social values and objectives of the organisations involved. A strong 
involvement of civil society in the organisations is helpful for this purpose. However, 
as we have seen, the emergence of social markets implicates a change in civil society 
involvement: from direct involvement in the delivery of social services, to indirect 
watchdog involvement. Also the nature of the civil society groups themselves has 
changed. The new watchdog organisations are not vested in religion or ideology, but 
are rather single-issue client organisations. In this last chapter we discuss how the 
governance model of social markets can accommodate these changes in civil society 
involvement.
In the previous chapter we already referred to changes in the governance structure of 
the home care and housing sector: the power now lies in the hands of a professional 
board of directors, while the role of the governors has been reduced to a supervisory 
one. After scandals such as the ones of Meavita and Rochdale, much of the discussion in 
the Netherlands focuses on the question of how the supervisory boards can strengthen 
their position in order to make sure that the organisations live up to their public 
responsibilities. The debate led to the introduction of voluntary codes of conduct es-
tablished by the various branch organisations active in social markets. Indeed, both the 
branch organisation of housing associations (Aedes) and the joint sector associations of 
health care organisations (BoZ) have developed their own governance codes.16 These 
codes include a variety of standards developed for both the supervisory councils and 
the board of directors to keep the organisations on the right track. The standards deal 
with issues such as the respective powers of supervisors and directors, the diversity 
among and the background of board members, remuneration (another contentious is-
sue!), whistle-blowers and complaints procedures. 
Both codes also contain paragraphs that are relevant for the involvement of civil so-
ciety. They stress the need for dialogue between the organisations and stakeholders 
and representatives of clients. For that reason, they must be provided with necessary 
information and consulted if the board contemplates important policy, organisational 
and managerial changes. At least one of the representatives should be given the ‘right 
to inquiry’ within the meaning of Title 8, part 2 of the Dutch Civil Code.
The new governance codes are voluntary and it is unclear to what extent the self-cor-
recting rules actually live up to their expectations. The permissiveness and the power of 
each organisation to come up with its own interpretation is a strength but also a weak-
ness of voluntary codes of conduct. The intention might be good, but once confronted 
with the struggle for survival or seduced by the prospects of gaining advantages, the 
good intentions may well be forgotten; if man is inclined to all evil, this also applies 
to the members of the boards of social market organisations. A more structural, less 
permissive approach would be to adopt standards of good governance in legislation. 
16 Aedes: governancecode woningbouwcorperaties 2011, available at www.aedesnet.nl/binaries/
downloads/dossier-verantwoording/dossier-toezicht/governancecode-woningcorporaties-
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In fact, the previous Dutch government proposed an act that does exactly that, namely 
the Social Enterprise Act (Wet op de maatschappelijke onderneming).17 
For our subject the Social Enterprise Act is a very interesting proposal. Social enterprises 
are referred to as any legal person in civil law that pursues a societal purpose; these 
are typically the organisations dealt with in this article, but they can also be schools, 
hospitals, retirement homes, charities, etc. The act is based upon the recognition that 
social enterprises are in-between the government and the market and it acknowledges 
that for these organisations to continue to be rooted in the society, extra measures are 
required. For that reason, not only the board of supervisors but also the clients are 
given a stronger position in relation to the directors. In addition to other legally re-
quired representative organs, such as client councils (home care providers) or residents 
committees (housing associations), social enterprises must set up so-called stakeholder 
councils where a broad range of stakeholders (such as relevant interest groups, client 
organisations and municipalities) are represented. The act furthermore spells out the 
rights of stakeholder councils in terms of information and consultation.18 
According to the original proposal, organisations are able to voluntarily adopt the 
social enterprise status. However, for the housing associations this freedom does not 
exist; they are supposed to have this status automatically, by operation of the act itself. 
Surprisingly, or perhaps unsurprisingly, Aedes, the branch organisation of housing 
associations, voiced strong opposition to the bill. As a matter of fact, so did BoZ, the 
branch organisation for health and home care. It is typical that both organisations, 
which have so loudly voiced their good intentions to work together with civil society 
in codes of conduct, are reluctant to submit themselves to the discipline of a new 
legislative framework, which has exactly the same intention! In a sense, this attitude 
casts a shadow over the sincerity of the good intentions formulated in of the voluntary 
governance codes of Aedes and BoZ. 
In the meantime, the whole project of the Social Enterprise Act has been called into 
question. The previous Dutch minority government of Rutte-Verhagen, supported by the 
ultra-right freedom party of Geert Wilders, decided to withdraw the entire proposal in 
November 2010. 
In our view there is nothing wrong with the government actually actively stimulating 
the involvement of civil society organisations, nor is it contradictory. In new social 
markets the government is no longer a direct provider of social services, but merely a 
distant regulator. In that sense there is less danger that the state encroaches too much 
on the free sphere of civil society; state action may also be geared towards its protec-
tion and promotion. With the emergence of new big commercial players in the social 
market, the involvement of civil society cannot be taken for granted. As the above 
case studies have shown, civil society must adjust, or even re-invent itself in order 
to continue to play a vital role. Government intervention can be directed towards the 
facilitation of this change. Per Saldo was originally even created by the government, but 
17 Wet tot wijziging van Boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek houdende regels voor de vereniging 
of stichting tot instandhouding van een maatschappelijke onderneming, Parliamentary Documents II 
2008-2009, 32 003 (in English: the Act to amend Book 2 of the Civil Code concerning rules for 
associations and foundations maintaining a social enterprise).
18 What remains unclear is the way these competences relate to the competences of existing legally 
required representative organs. The parliamentary documents state that it is up to the social 
enterprise itself to determine how these competences relate to each other (Parliamentary Documents II 
2008-2009, 32 003, No 3, page 27).
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then subsequently continued to grow largely on the basis of grass roots support. Woon-
bond also receives subsidies from the state. Giving client representation groups a formal 
status in the legal structure of social enterprises, is just another way to stimulate the 
creation of such groups and to give them increased legitimacy as ‘respected outsiders’. 
